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when the state was a defendant, likewise the same rule applied to
counties.
It would appear that under the statute as amended costs would now
be allowed the private party in both of these cases. By the amending
clauses the state and counties are liable for costs when they are defendants as well as when they are plaintiffs. Furthermore, they are
liable for costs on appeal to the supreme court regardless of whether
they are plaintiff or defendant.
One word of caution might be appropriate. The statute does not
purport to affect the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The statute does
not constitute a general consent to be sued by the state. It is simply a
provision that in those instances in which the state or counties are
proper parties, they shall be liable for costs to the same extent as
private parties.
Jurors' Fees. Chapter 73 of the 1959 Session Laws amends RCW
2.36.150 to provide that jurors' fees in the superior courts shall be ten
dollars per day instead of five dollars. This is in recognition of the
fact that the old rate of compensation worked a real hardship on
conscientious citizens who were called for jury service and who made
no objection. The old rate also undoubtedly resulted in requests for
excuse from service by other equally conscientious citizens who simply
could not afford the financial sacrifice. Though the increase will be
welcomed, one may question whether it is adequate. The Judicial
Council, for example, had recommended that the compensation of
jurors be increased to fifteen dollars per day. The compensation for
jury service before a justice of the peace court and upon a coroner's
jury remains the same, four dollars per day. Likewise, there has been
no change in the mileage rate of ten cents per mile.

Plm- A.

TRAU TmA

REAL PROPERTY
Rule Against Perpetuities in Trust Dispositions. By the enactment
of chapter 146, labeled by the code reviser "Trusts-Rule against
Perpetuities," Washington has joined the group of states deciding to
"wait-and-see" whether the actually developed facts involve remote
dispositions violating the Rule Against Perpetuities, rather than determining violations as the common law rule requires on the basis of possibilities, however unlikely to occur. This statute gives Washington
only a limited membership, however, for it is restricted to trust dispo-
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sitions, and at least in terms will not affect dispositions of legal interests
(outside of those inherently involved in trust instruments). Theoretically much of the area of common law operation of the rule will remain
undisturbed, but here two observations may be made. First, it would
be possible for the court to decide the statute reflects a general policy
decision by the legislature that the destructive force of the common
law rule should be deflected from possible but not probable factual
situations, thus limiting frustration of dispositive schemes to limitations which actually take effect at a point in time remote from the
effective date of the creating instrument. Florida and New Hampshire
took this position without the aid of any statute.' There is probably
nothing in the decisions of the Washington court which indicates this
extension, or judicial adoption of, "wait-and-see" is probable, but
neither is there anything in the decisions which reflects particular argument that abandonment of the common law rule is undesirable. Second,
it is almost certain that most litigated problems of perpetuities arise
in trust dispositions. The policy of the rule, fostering full alienability,
is to some extent invaded as a practical matter by the use of the
acceptable trust device. If the settlor's desires are to have substantial
weight in controlling dispositions, there will probably be some period
of theoretical or practical inalienability because of the trust, so inapplicability of the rule during this period may very well not seriously
invade the policy area. Modification of the application of the rule to
trusts thus both meets situations most likely to arise and, perhaps,
extends only slightly the invasion of the policy area of the rule.
The new statute is original. It does not follow the pattern used in
other states or suggested elsewhere. The statute sort of backs into the
problem. If the dispositive scheme does not violate the rule the statute
has no application. If any provision of the trust instrument does
violate the rule all provisions of the trust are nonetheless to remain
valid during the "wait-and-see" periods which, by section 1 may be
the full "life in being plus twenty-one years" of the common law rule,
rather than merely expiration of life estates. By section 2 if during
the period "in which ... any provision... is not to be rendered invalid.. ." assets become distributable or interests vest, the distribution
1 See 6 Am. L. Pxop. § 24.8, p. 29, and supp. The literature on "wait-and-see" is
cited and some discussion of the problem found in 6 AM. L. PRop. § 24.11 and supp.;
5 PowELL, REAL PRop., pars. 765, 766, 769; 3 SmEs AND SmrTH, FUTuRE INTERESTS
(2d ed.), § 1230, and supp.; Legislators' Handbook on Perpetuities, Amer. Bar Assn.
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law; and the reports of the Committee
on Rules Against Perpetuities, in the Proceedings of the Section.
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and vesting are valid. At the end of the period, if the trust has not
exhausted itself, the court is directed to distribute the assets "giving
effect to the general intent of the creator of the trust." Section 3.
The immediate impetus for the proposal to the legislature in 1957
was In re Lee's Estate, 49 Wn.2d 254, 299 P.2d 1066 (1956), in which
the court held void the trust limitation (after a life estate) to children
of the life tenant living when the youngest reached 40 years of age, and
certain alternative limitations over. The trust did not fail, however,
because the court made some sense of an ambiguous additional alternative for distribution one day short of the full period permitted by law.
It is the writer's understanding that the basic scheme of the Lee trust
would almost certainly have been fully accomplished before 20 years,
364 days after the life tenant's death, and the result of the decision
is to continue the trust longer than was probably contemplated. It
was the writer's hope that resubmission of the proposal in 1959 would
be preceded by extensive study and analysis of the whole perpetuity
area and perhaps even other areas of property law long needing modernization in this state, but in 1959 the same proposal, modified only
by the addition of the "cy pres" section 3, was introduced and became
the law.
The writer has been told that only rarely in the experience of the
sponsors has there been a trust which would not fully exhaust itself
according to the basic scheme of the settlor within the new statutory
"wait-and-see" periods. This circumstance, effectuation of the settlor's
primary intent, is the principal justification for the legislation. Difficulties probably can arise in applying the statute though it appears
unlikely there will be many, but unless the court extends the principle
of the statute to antecedent trusts, there may be inchoate frustrations
yet to come to light.
Assessment and Taxation of Easements. The enactment of chapter 129 will provide desirable protection for holders of easements
against property tax defaults by the servient owner. Previously on
foreclosure of taxes all outstanding rights were destroyed and the tax
title was "new" with the consequence that an easement holder might
be practically compelled to pay another's tax to preserve his easement.
The statute declares the general property tax assessed on any "real
property includes all easements appurtenant thereto, provided said
easements are a matter of public record in the auditor's office.. "and,
correlatively, that a tax deed issued pursuant to foreclosure of de-
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linquent taxes "shall be subject to such easement... provided [it was]
established of record prior to the year for which the tax was foredosed."
Easements created by express grant or reservation, i.e. by adequate
writing, and appearing of record unquestionably affect the value of
both dominant and servient estates and therefore the assessed value,
but their existence did not appear on tax rolls or in tax deeds. Thus the

court held the full title, unrestricted by easement, passed by the tax
deed of the former servient estate. Whether a tax deed of the dominant
estate would pass title to an easement appurtenant to a tract foreclosed
without the new statute is not clear, though consistency should indicate
it would not. Such result would be a windfall to the servient owner.
The statute can be construed to declare (not change) the law applicable
to existing situations as regards taxation of dominant estates so that
tax deeds will carry appurtenant easements without express mention
as is true of private grants, but clearly there is a change in the effect of
tax foreclosure of servient estates.
Ordinary easements by implication and implied ways of necessity
are not covered by the new law. They may still be susceptible to
destruction. Private easements in subdivisions may not be covered
depending upon the interpretation chosen for the "matter of public
record" and "established of record" language. If these latter easements are within the statute, acquisition of a dominant tract through
a tax deed might now qualify the title holder to enforce his easement
against other lot owners ("common grantees") to the confounding of
the creation by estoppel reasoning previously suggested by the Washington cases. See 34 WASH. L. REv. 212, 215 (1959).
Aspects of the pre-existing law were discussed in King, The Assessment and Taxation of Easements, 16 WASH. L. Rxv. 36 (1941); Note,
23 WASH. L. REv. 75 (1948).
HARRY M. CRoss
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Material and Equipment Suppliers' Liens-Time of Giving Notice of Lien to Property Owners and rriorities between Liens.
RCW chapter 60.04, the basic construction-industry Hen statute, has
been amended again. Heretofore, a supplier of material to a contractor
has had a Hen only if he notified the owner within a period set in the
statute1 that material was being supplied and a lien might be claimed.
(If notice is timely given the Hen covers all material delivered by the
Ten days in the instance of "any single family residence or garage" and sixty days
in other instances. RCW 60.04.020.

